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This paper studies the cycles of nationalization and privatization in resource-rich economies. We discuss
available evidence on the drivers and consequences of privatization and nationalization, review the
existing literature, and present illustrative case studies. Our main contribution is then to develop a
static and dynamic model of the choice between private and national regimes for the ownership of
natural resources. In the model, this choice is driven by a basic equality-efficiency tradeoff: national
ownership results in more redistribution of income and more equality, but undermines incentives for
effort. The resolution of the tradeoff depends on external and domestic conditions that affect the value
of social welfare under each regime. This allows us to characterize how external variables — suchas
the commodity price — and domestic ones — such as the tax system — affect the choice of privateYV
national regimes. The analysis therefore identifies the determinants of the observed cycles of privatization
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Why is the process of institutional innovation so volatile and often subject to reversion, partic-
ularly in developing countries? While the process of technological innovation generally follows
a pattern of continuous progress, the process of institutional reform takes a more complex,
cyclical pattern. Institutional reform tends to occur in times of crises but often, as social or
economic conditions change, these reforms are reversed (Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998).
One of the most salient institutional reforms in the post-communist era has been the privat-
ization of commercial enterprises all around the world (Chong and Lopez de Silanes, 2005).
Lately, however, the bene￿ts of privatization have been called into question, and many coun-
tries have moved to re-nationalize some of these enterprises (Manzano and Monaldi, 2008). In
no area has this been more prevalent than in the exploitation of commodities in resource-rich
economies (Kobrin, 1984; Rigobon, 2009). Looking back at the historical experience, it becomes
evident that many of these economies have moved back and forth between private and national
regimes (Chua, 1995; Minor 1994). Their behavior is a prime example of the instability of in-
stitutions, de￿ned as the set of rules and norms under which the economy functions. Compared
to these regime shifts, other issues surrounding the exploitation and administration of natural
resources seem to be of secondary importance.
This paper studies the cycles of nationalization and privatization in resource-rich economies
as a prime instance of unstable institutional reform. It starts by presenting available evidence
on the drivers and consequences of privatization and nationalization. We review the received
literature and identify systematic patterns on regime choices and shifts. We then present
an analytical narrative of an illustrative case study (Bolivia and hydrocarbons) of repeated
nationalization and privatization of a natural-resource industry. (The Appendix examines two
additional cases, Venezuela-oil and Zambia-copper, which show rather similar patterns.) We
focus on the periods before and after privatization and nationalization of the natural resource,
with the objective of relating regime shifts to the behavior of the price of the commodity, its
level of production and capital investment, the taxes and other ￿scal revenues derived from its
2exploitation, and the level of average income and degree of inequality of society at large.
The literature review and the case studies motivate and provide a context for the main
contribution of the paper: a dynamic model of the choice between private and national regimes.
The model is built around a basic tradeo⁄ between equality and e¢ ciency. Greater equality is
obtained under public ownership of a ￿national￿resource, while more e¢ ciency obtains when
the ownership and administration of the resource are in private hands. The connection between
ownership and the equality-e¢ ciency tradeo⁄is given by the set of incentives for e⁄ort that each
regime provides to economic agents. In the private regime, there is a di⁄erential compensation
scheme that depends on observed productivity, thus encouraging agents to increase their e⁄orts.
Under the national regime, the government cannot credibly commit not to equalize income ex
post 1 thus engendering equality but also minimal individual e⁄ort.2
The resolution of the tradeo⁄ depends on external and domestic conditions that a⁄ect
national welfare under each regime. Hence our framework allow us to study how external
variables ￿ such as the price of the commodity in question￿and domestic ones ￿ such as the tax
regime and government quality￿a⁄ect the choice of private or national regimes. As external
and domestic conditions ￿ uctuate, cycles of privatization and nationalization emerge.
We argue that the theory is consistent with the stylized facts highlighted in our empirical
review. Realistically, the model implies that privatization results in an increase of e¢ ciency at
the expense of consumption inequality. It also implies that privatization occurs when resource
prices fall, while increases in resource prices eventually lead to nationalization. In addition,
the model identi￿es several factors and parameters that determine the choice of nationalization
vis-a-vis privatization. Increased risk aversion, for example, makes inequality more costly, and
hence favors nationalization. This is re￿ ected in the model in a decrease in the threshold price at
which the country is better o⁄by switching from a privatized regime to state ownership and, in
the dynamic version of the model, an increase in the average duration of state ownership regimes.
1This assumption is similar in spirit to that of Perotti (1995), but our model and analysis is quite di⁄erent.
2In the model, work e⁄ort is a proxy for all activities that are a⁄ected by economic incentives and that may
have an impact on productivity. From a long run perspective, therefore, it does not only represent labor but
also investment in human and physical capital, as well as managerial and entrepreneurial endeavors.
3Likewise, in the dynamic model, an increase in exogenous costs of nationalizing previously
privatized industries reduces not only the likelihood of nationalization but also makes it more
unlikely that a nationalized sector be privatized. This is because privatization is not forever,
and hence its value depends on the option to re-nationalize the industry, which falls with the
aforementioned exogenous costs.
Our model stresses that observed cycles of privatization and nationalization may ultimately
re￿ ect the inability of a government to commit to a given policy; in our case, restraining itself
from redistributing income ex-post when the domestic resource is under state ownership. In
this sense, our theory implies that institutional reform can break such cycles, but only if better
institutions enhance the state￿ s ability not to renege on previous promises. The model also
illustrates how political tensions about increased inequality and the associated con￿ ict can
naturally emerge as a by product of the solution of the equity-e¢ ciency problem. In contrast,
we assign no direct role to other political characteristics, such as ideological preferences or
historical colonization origins, which are sometimes stressed in the literature.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the main facts surrounding the
occurrence of privatization and nationalization. It ￿rst reviews the existing literature and then
presents the experience of Bolivia as a case study of regime shifts. Sections 3 and 4 develop a
model on the choice between private and national regimes. Section 3 discusses the static model,
taking the regime choice as given. Section 4 introduces a dynamic version, where the possibility
of regime choice and shifts arises. By calibrating and simulating the model, we explore and
discuss the characteristics under which each of the regimes is more likely to be prevalent and
the conditions that lead to more frequent regime changes. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
The received literature documents ￿ve key facts that motivate and guide our theoretical exam-
ination:
4Fact 1: Nationalizations and privatizations are repeated, cyclical phenomena, which often
come in waves common to several countries. Kobrin (1984) analyzed expropriations in 79
developing countries over the period 1960-79. He found that expropriations grew in the 1960s,
peaked in the early 1970s and declined afterwards. Minor (1994) and Sa￿k (1996) extended
Kobrin￿ s study to include the period up to 1993. They found that in the late 1980s and early
1990s, as many as 95 countries around the world experienced extensive privatization processes.
Most recently, however, Manzano and Monaldi (2008) report the opposite trend in the last few
years, albeit in a smaller group of countries, mostly in Latin America. For them, the current
wave of nationalization is only the latest chapter of a repeating cycle, as they had previously
experienced the nationalizations of the 1970s and the privatizations of the 1990s.
Chua (1995) is arguably the most comprehensive historical study of the privatization -
nationalization cycle, with focus on Latin America and Southeast Asia. She found that, in
spite of the di⁄erences between these two regions, there is an observable tendency of cycling
back and forth between nationalization and privatization in both regions. In Latin America
(most prominently, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela), a ￿rst wave of
privatization extended from the 1870s to the 1920s. Partly as reaction to the Great Depression,
nationalizations became quite frequent and extensive in the 1930s. After World War II, a
second tide of privatization occurred, only to be reversed under the populist regimes of the
1960s and 1970s. Two decades later, in the early 1990s, the pendulum ￿ uctuated back to
privatization, which, as mentioned above, occurred in a massive scale. In Southeast Asia
(particularly, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand), the cycle started later given their more recent
history of independence. Initially, most of the economy was privately run. This changed in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, when extensive nationalizations occurred. Also coinciding with
the Latin American cycle, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many state-owned companies were
privatized in Southeast Asia.
Fact 2: Privatization - nationalization cycles tend to occur more often in the natural re-
sources and utilities sectors. Kobrin (1984) documents that in the last ￿ve decades expropri-
5ations encompassing large portions of the economy do occur, but they are less frequent than
selective expropriations and have been mostly concentrated in a dozen of countries. In her his-
torical account, Chua (1995) also ￿nds that in the majority of countries under analysis, utility
and natural resource companies are signi￿cantly more prone to undergo the nationalization and
privatization recurring cycle. Her account of the ownership swings of oil exploitation companies
in Latin America is particularly revealing.
The next fact is related to the previous one and has to do with the underlying causes of
ownership changes:
Fact 3: Nationalization of natural resource industries tends to occur when the price of the
corresponding commodity is high. Duncan (2006) investigated the causes of expropriation in
the minerals sectors of developing country exporters. In this study, expropriation is de￿ned as
any act by which a government gains a greater income share than it was entitled to under the
original contract with the foreign investor. The sample analyzed consists of the eight largest
developing country exporters for seven major minerals (bauxite, cooper, lead, nickel, silver,
tin and zinc). Covering the period 1960-2002, Duncan used probit regressions to estimate the
e⁄ects of price booms and political and economic crises on the probability of expropriation.
The results indicated that price booms are signi￿cantly positively correlated with the instances
of expropriation. The paper concluded that a high real price for minerals is a stronger predictor
for state expropriation risk than political or economic crises are. In a related study, Guriev,
Kolotilin, and Sonin (2009) examined the determinants of nationalization in the oil sector,
using panel data for 161 countries for the period 1960-2002. They run logit pooled regressions of
nationalization events on oil price shocks and the quality of government institutions, controlling
for country ￿xed e⁄ects and per capita GDP, among other variables. The regression results
showed that governments are more likely to practice expropriations when the oil price is high
and when government institutions are weak (although the latter result is controversial, as we
discuss below).
A fourth fact is also related to commodity price changes and their e⁄ect on ￿scal revenues:
6Fact 4: Contracts for the exploitation of natural resources between governments and private
companies are such that commodity price windfalls are mostly appropriated by private ￿rms.
This may explain why nationalizations tend to occur during commodity price booms. Manzano
and Monaldi (2008) analyzed the recent trend of nationalization in the Latin American oil
sector, pointing out to issues in the taxation system and political economy of this sector. The
oil industry is in general characterized by considerable rents and sunk costs. This makes the
industry very attractive for government expropriation when oil prices rise and the tax system
is inadequate, in the sense of being regressive and lacking consideration for price contingencies.
Accordingly, the authors argue that the new wave of nationalizations is induced largely by
the increase in the international oil price.3 Likewise, in his study on expropriation in the
mineral sector in major exporting countries, Duncan (2006) argues that a combination of high
commodity prices and low pro￿t sharing from private ￿rms to host governments gave them
large incentives to expropriate.
The last fact is also related to underlying causes of ownership changes:
Fact 5: Nationalization is more likely when inequality is endemic or worsens in the coun-
try, and especially when the rents from natural resource or utility companies are perceived as
bene￿tting only a minority. Chua (1995) concluded that nationalization in Latin America and
Southeast Asia was promoted against not only foreigners but also domestic residents who were
perceived as unfairly privileged. The private ownership and management of utility and natural
resource companies was deemed to have worsened the inequality already present in these societ-
ies. Accordingly, di⁄erences across ethnic lines were a key factor to induce the ownership shifts
in Southeast Asia, while an anti-elitist movement played a signi￿cant role in Latin America.
3Rigobon (2008) studied oil production and pro￿t-sharing contracts between governments and private com-
panies. The simulation analysis of his model was directed at comparing two kinds of tax mechanisms ￿royalties
and income taxes. His results showed that royalties can generate more stable tax revenues and lower agency
costs. However, they may create more distortions in the production plan (because the quantity produced is
more susceptible to price ￿ uctuations when royalties increase). More controversially, Rigobon argued that under
royalties, the probability that ￿rms may earn large pro￿ts is higher, thereby stimulating government￿ s incentive
for expropriation. By contrast, with income taxes, the volatility of private pro￿ts is lower, thus possibly mitig-
ating expropriation risk. However, the variance of the tax revenue stream is higher and the potential losses due
to agency problems are larger under income taxes
7The social pressure stemming from inequality is heightened and realized in times of government
changes. This may explain why Duncan (2006) ￿nds that mineral expropriations were more
likely during the wave of independence of developing countries and also why Guriev, Kolotin,
and Sonin (2009) ￿nd that oil nationalizations tended to occur when government leadership
was replaced.
Finally, we should remark that the relationship between the likelihood of nationalization
and government regime type is rather ambiguous. While Duncan (2006) ￿nds that mineral
expropriations are more likely during democratic governments, Guriev, Kolotin, and Sonin
(2009) ￿nd that oil nationalizations tend to happen when democracy and constraints on the
executive are weak. Moreover, as pointed out above, Duncan ￿nds no connection between
mineral nationalizations and political crises (except independence). It would seem that the
underlying pressures of wealth and income inequality, observed high commodity prices, and
perceived unfairness in the distribution of natural resource pro￿ts can lead to nationalizations
in both democracies and dictatorships and under both political stability and political disruption.
Case Study: Bolivia and Hydrocarbons
Bolivia￿ s ￿rst oil well was built by the Standard Oil Company in 1922 and its ￿rst oil ￿eld
began production just two years later. Standard Oil￿ s operations in Bolivia proved to be quite
pro￿table. The Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-35) convinced the Bolivian
government of the importance of natural resource ownership for both economic and geopolitical
considerations. It became quite clear that Standard Oil was bene￿tting greatly from the oil
concessions it had obtained. In 1936 Colonel David Toro founded the state-owned petroleum
company, Bolivian Fiscal Oil Fields (YPFB, its Spanish abbreviation), and the next year the
government con￿scated all of the Standard Oil Company￿ s holdings. Standard Oil￿ s expulsion
from Bolivia was the ￿rst-ever nationalization in Latin America, and e⁄ectively nationalized
Bolivia￿ s entire petroleum industry. The next decade was a dynamic political period in Bolivia.
In 1952, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) overthrew a military regime and
8conducted a revolutionary program that granted universal su⁄rage, implemented agrarian and
educational reform, and nationalized the country￿ s mines. Contrary to government expecta-
tions, however, agricultural output dropped, tin production halved, the country experienced
in￿ ation rates of 900%, and hydrocarbon production was well below potential.
In 1956, in the midst of the economic downturn, HernÆn Siles Zuazo was elected president.
He initiated a new economic program that invited North American petroleum companies back
to Bolivia. He encouraged them to invest by passing a new hydrocarbon law, The Davenport
Code. The law granted foreign companies property rights over the oil and gas they discovered.
In 1961, the Gulf Oil Company discovered new natural gas and petroleum reserves, and in 1964
it renewed its contract with the Bolivian government and negotiated concessions to gas and
pipeline rights in the country. In 1968 a mixed company of YPFB and Gulf Oil was founded
and plans were made to export gas to Argentina. Clearly, the large investments in exploration,
extraction, and distribution of hydrocarbons were paying o⁄, as production improved sharply
and pro￿ts increased several fold.
In 1969 Alfredo Obando seized government control through a coup d￿ Øtat. Soon after,
Obando nationalized the much coveted Gulf Oil at a cost of $78 million, a fraction of its true
worth. YFPB was left as the sole supplier of natural gas to Argentina. During the 1970s
Bolivian politics continued their dynamic and tumultuous course. Maybe re￿ ecting this mixed
environment, the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources was conducted by an uneasy partnership
of public and private interests. In fact, in 1972 the government passed the General Hydrocarbon
Law to promote foreign investment, even if government retained property rights. The YPFB
signed contracts with private ￿rms and began exporting natural gas to Argentina.
From 1978 to 1982 Bolivia experienced one of the most turbulent periods in its political
history. Nine presidents came and went during the four year period, and the economy de-
teriorated severely. In 1985, when Victor Paz Estenssoro was inaugurated as president, he
faced skyrocketing in￿ ation rates and a dire economic situation. He responded by implement-
ing The New Economic Policy. The program froze wages, raised the price of fuel, devalued
9the Bolivian peso, eliminated price supports, and laid o⁄ four-￿fths of the mining workforce.
After the reforms, Gross national income per capita (GNI) began a noticeable upward trend,
whereas inequality, as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient, fell almost ten points (see Figure 1.c).
In contrast, investment in the energy sector and total FDI experienced only a small increase in
1987 and then remained relatively ￿ at (Figure 1.b). After a small increase in 1986, Bolivia￿ s
gas production stagnated and reserves were continually low (Figure 1.a). This lack of positive
response was partly due to low hydrocarbon prices. In fact, while the new reforms were being
implemented, natural gas prices continued to fall. They trended down steadily until 1992 when
they experienced a small spike￿ o⁄set almost entirely in 1994￿ before continuing their descent
(see Figure 1.a). Nevertheless, as the events that followed suggest, the lack of activity in the
hydrocarbon sector was also due to the weak incentives that nationalized ownership implied.
In 1993, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada won the presidency with a privatization and capit-
alization program. A year after his election, GNI was still trending upward and there was
signi￿cantly lower income inequality. In this domestic environment and with still low hydro-
carbon prices, Sanchez de Lozada privatized nearly the entire state-run economy by selling
controlling interests in six large companies, including YPFB. Immediately thereafter, Bolivia￿ s
FDI began a dramatic and steady upward climb (see Figure 1.b). Investment in the energy
sector increased as well, and production of natural gas began growing just a year later. Despite
gas prices￿continued ￿ uctuation￿ an upward trend was not evident until at least 1999￿ gas
reserves began a gradual upward trend in 1996. The e⁄ects of investment and production in-
creases were evident and reserves jumped from 14.05 trillion cubic feet in 1999 to 49.82 tcf in
2000. Reserves peaked in 2003 at 7901 tcf, a 463% increase over a ￿ve year period. In 1997,
Bolivia completed construction of a natural gas pipeline to Brazil, which represented the coun-
try￿ s single largest investment￿ the Bolivian component alone had cost $550 million. It was
also a testament to the sizeable sunk investments necessary to exploit the country￿ s natural gas
reserves.
After two other administrations, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was elected for a second period
10in 2002. Following the downward economic tide in Latin America, the Bolivian economy went
into a recession. After peaking in 1998, gross national income per capita began a steady
decline and income inequality rose. Discontent became widespread and protesters demanded
nationalization of the country￿ s natural gas resources. Tensions peaked in October 2003 when
riots broke out in opposition to the potential construction of a pipeline to Chile for use in future
gas exports to the U.S. Now referred to as The Gas War, the unrest resulted in approximately
60 deaths and one thousand injured civilians. Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign and Vice-
president Carlos Mesa took over. In 2004 Mesa held a referendum on hydrocarbon property
rights, but even this did not quell the violent demonstrations, and he was ultimately forced to
resign as well.
Figure 1.c illustrates the changing economic situation. In 1999 GNI began a steady down-
ward trend and, perhaps even more importantly, the Gini coe¢ cient rose dramatically (from
1991 to 2003 the Gini rose almost 43 percent). Rising inequality was concurrent with a steady
decline in the share of government collection in the value of oil and gas production. The falling
percentage was likely attributable to the fact that the Bolivian government generally collected
revenues through ￿xed royalty payments (Manzano and Monaldi, 2008). When the price of gas
rose, as happened from 1995 to 2005, the production value rose while the government￿ s take
remained ￿xed.
In December 2005 Evo Morales, founder of the party Movement Toward Socialism, was elec-
ted president. Amidst rising gas prices, declining ￿scal contribution of the gas companies, and
increasing inequality, he had gained popularity by campaigning on a platform of nationalization.
FDI and investment in the energy sector had been trending down since 1999, and in the year
of Morales￿election they both plummeted. In fact, FDI in 2005 was actually negative. Natural
gas prices, on the other hand, reached a historical peak in 2005. On May 1, 2006, in accordance
with his campaign promises, Morales nationalized Bolivia￿ s gas ￿elds and oil industry.
113 A Single Period
This section and the next develop a model of an industry that can operate under either a
private ownership regime or a state ownership regime. The economy is in￿nitely lived, but in
this section we con￿ne attention to one typical period given the ownership regime, and focus on
the determination of the net bene￿ts of each regime. This hinges on a crucial e¢ ciency-equity
tradeo⁄derived from a moral hazard problem, together with the inability of the government to
commit not to redistribute income under state ownership.
More speci￿cally, we assume that the productivity of workers depends on unobservable
e⁄ort.4 E¢ cient contracts would then prescribe that more productive workers be paid more
than less productive ones, in order to elicit the right amount of e⁄ort. While this is possible
under private ownership, the government cannot refrain from equalizing the incomes of workers
ex post under state ownership. But this destroys incentives for e⁄ort. The result is that private
ownership is associated with more e¢ ciency but less equality than state ownership, which is
consistent with the stylized facts stressed in the previous section. Importantly, the result of
the equity-e¢ ciency tradeo⁄ depends on a number of parameters, such as the degree of risk
aversion, as well as other exogenous data including the price of the country￿ s resource.
3.1 Workers
We consider an economy that produces a commodity via an increasing and concave production
function F = F (L), where L is labor input. Because technology is strictly concave, there is an
implicit ￿xed factor of production that can be interpreted as land or capital.
The commodity is sold in the world market in exchange for world currency, which is taken
as numeraire. The commodity price, denoted by p, is exogenous to the economy under analysis.
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical workers of measure N > 0.
4As mentioned in the introduction, work e⁄ort in the model represents, in general, economic activities that are
in￿ uenced by remuneration incentives and that may, in turn, a⁄ect production and productivity. They include
not only labor input but also human and physical capital investment, as well as managerial and entrepreneurial
behavior. As in the case of work e⁄ort in the model, these activities are subject to moral hazard in the sense
that their compensation is tied to observed productivity and not only exercised input.
12The labor supply of worker i 2 [0;N], denoted by li, is a random variable whose distribution
depends on worker i￿ s e⁄ort, ai: One can interpret li as the worker￿ s productivity for the
job, which may be uncertain but is enhanced, on average, by e⁄ort spent on education or
training. Crucially, labor supply is observable by everyone but e⁄ort is private information of
the worker. Because exerting e⁄ort is costly, the asymmetry of information introduces moral
hazard problems into the model.
Naturally, exerting more e⁄ort is bene￿cial for productivity. For simplicity, assume that li
can be either high (li = lH) or low (li = lL < lH), and that the probability of high productivity
is an increasing and concave function of e⁄ort: Pr(li = lHja) = ￿(a), where ￿(a);￿0(a) > 0 and
￿00(a) < 0. Given e⁄ort, the realization of labor productivity is i.i.d. across workers. We follow
the standard assumption of imposing a law of large numbers so that if all workers spend e⁄ort
a, the actual proportion of workers with high productivity equals ￿ (a).
Consider the decision problem of an individual worker. Regardless of the industry regime,
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5The condition ￿(0) = 0 is an innocuous normalization and ￿
0 (0) = 0 is used to guarantee that positive
e⁄ort is chosen whenever y￿
H > y￿
L.
13This has an obvious interpretation. ￿
0(a) is the cost of increasing e⁄ort by an in￿nitesimal unit;
the gain is that, with increased probability, ￿0(a), the agent gets to consume y￿
H + T instead
of y￿
L + T: Then, under our assumptions, a > 0 if and only if y￿
H > y￿
L: the worker will exert
e⁄ort only if a more productive worker is paid more. Moreover, condition (2) implies that e⁄ort
increases in the wage di⁄erential.6
The wage structure, taxes, and industry ownership regime are taken as given to individual
workers, but are endogenous from the viewpoint of the economy as a whole. We now turn to
their determination.
3.2 State Ownership
Consider a period in which the industry is under state ownership. We make two assumptions
about this regime:
￿ The government maximizes an equally weighted sum of the utilities of domestic workers.
￿ Under state ownership, the government chooses a wage schedule and taxes after e⁄ort has
been spent and individual productivity is observed.
The last assumption is the crucial one. It can be justi￿ed on the basis of political pressures.
Any wage contract o⁄ered in advance of the choice of e⁄ort is assumed to be non-credible, as
the state would always be able to renegotiate the terms of the contract. Alternatively, one may
assume that the state can impose taxes and transfers to e⁄ectively undo any prior contract.
Under these assumptions, risk sharing motives lead the government to choose a wage sched-
ule that equalizes consumption across agents: yH = yL. This is because, at the time the
government chooses the wage schedule, e⁄ort and individual productivity are already given.
Hence the wage schedule no longer distorts e⁄ort choice, and the government chooses it to
prevent consumption inequality.
6To see this, let ￿ = y￿
H￿y￿
L, and rewrite (2) as u(￿+y￿
L+T)￿u(y￿
L+T) = ￿(a), where ￿ (a) = ￿
0(a)=￿0(a).
Di⁄erentiating this expression with respect to ￿, and noting that ￿0(a) > 0, gives da=d￿ > 0.
14But, of course, if agents predict that their compensation does not depend on productivity,
they will exert the minimum amount of e⁄ort; namely, aS = 0. Labor input then falls to its
minimum value.
More formally, and assuming (without loss of generality) that T = 0, given any probability
of high productivity, ￿, the planner chooses yH and yL to maximize the sum of workers￿utilities:
N [￿u(yH) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(yL)]
subject to the feasibility constraint
N [￿yH + (1 ￿ ￿)yL] = pF(N (￿lH + (1 ￿ ￿)lL))
The term on the left side is the total wage cost: a number ￿N of workers are productive
and are paid yH each, while (1￿￿)N workers are less productive and receive yL. The right side
is the value of production, noting that total labor input is the sum of N￿lH from productive
workers and N(1￿￿)lL from the less productive ones. Note that, in this problem, the planner
takes ￿ as given, since ￿ is determined by the prior e⁄ort choices of workers.
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to yH and yL are
￿u
0(yH) = ￿￿; (1 ￿ ￿)u
0(yL) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿);
where ￿ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint. The optimal allocation
implies u0(yH) = u0(yL). Hence, given the strict concavity of the utility function, yH = yL.
Return now to the worker￿ s problem. As discussed above, yH = yL implies that e⁄ort is
zero, a = 0. Hence, aggregate labor supply is LS = N [￿(0)lH + (1 ￿ ￿(0))lL], which is the
smallest possible labor supply.
We see, then, that state ownership results in perfect equity but ine¢ ciently low e⁄ort choice.
This is because the government cannot refrain from equalizing workers￿consumption ex post,
15which destroys any incentives for exerting e⁄ort.
For future reference, note that the welfare of the typical worker under state ownership is
US = US(p) = u(pF(LS)=N):
which is a function of the commodity price p.
3.3 Private Ownership
In periods in which the industry operates under private ownership, the key di⁄erence is that
private owners can commit to pay di⁄erent amounts to workers according to their productivity.
This implies that private ownership will result in more e¢ cient e⁄ort choice. But this comes
at the expense of equity.
We assume an industry structure in which private owners compete for workers. There is
a continuum of ￿rms of measure 1. Each ￿rm produces domestic goods via the production
function F(L), sells the goods at the price p, and pays two taxes, a dividend tax 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 and
a sales tax 0 ￿ ￿ < 1. The receipts from these taxes are rebated lump-sum to the workers.7
Each ￿rm takes as given a wage schedule fy￿
H;y￿
Lg of what highly productive and less pro-
ductive workers are paid in the market. Given those market prices, each ￿rm o⁄ers its own
wage schedule fyH;yLg and chooses the number of workers n and a suggested e⁄ort level a to
maximize expected pro￿ts
fp(1 ￿ ￿)F(n[￿(a)lH + (1 ￿ ￿(a))lL]) ￿ n[￿(a)yH + (1 ￿ ￿(a))yL]g(1 ￿ ￿)
7An alternative approach is to assume a unique ￿rm. A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that the
￿rm will have monopsonistic power on the labor input it hires. This monopsonistic power together with the
optimal contract under imperfect information delivers the extreme result that workers with low productivity are
paid zero. With our industry structure, all workers have an outside option in the labor market and, therefore,
wages will not be zero for low productivity workers. Although we consider more reasonable the multiple ￿rms
approach, all qualitative results hold if we assume an industry structure with a unique ￿rm.
16subject to
u(yH + T) ￿ u(yL + T) ￿ ￿ (a) = 0 (3)
￿(a)u(yH + T) + (1 ￿ ￿(a))u(yL + T) ￿ ￿(a) ￿ U
￿:
where ￿ (a) = ￿
0 (a)=￿0 (a).
The ￿rst constraint is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and requires the wage
schedule fyH;yLg and suggested e⁄ort a to be consistent with the worker￿ s optimal e⁄ort
choice.8 The second constraint is the participation or individual rationality (IR) constraint and
requires the proposed contract to provide a level of utility at least as large as U￿, the utility





H + T) + (1 ￿ ￿(a
￿))u(y
￿
L + T) ￿ ￿(a
￿).
Let ￿(1 ￿ ￿) and ￿(1 ￿ ￿) denote the Lagrange multipliers on the IC and IR constraints.
The ￿rst order condition with respect to n is
p(1 ￿ ￿)F
0(n‘(a))‘(a) = ￿(a)yH + (1 ￿ ￿(a))yL; (4)
where ‘(a) = ￿(a)lH + (1 ￿ ￿(a))lL is the expected labor supply given e⁄ort a. The intuition
is simple. Since each worker is expected to supply ‘(a) units of labor, the left hand side is the
expected increase in revenue to the ￿rm of hiring one more worker. The wage cost of doing so
will be yH if the worker turns out to be productive, that is, with probability ￿(a); and yL if the
worker has low productivity. Hence the right hand side is the expected wage payment to the
additional worker.
8Using the worker￿ s ￿rst order condition as a constraint on the principal￿ s problem does not guarantee the
optimality of the contract. This ￿ ￿rst order approach￿is valid if the distribution function of labor endowment
conditional on e⁄ort satis￿es a monotone likelihood ratio condition and a convexity assumption (Rogerson,
1985). These two conditions are satis￿ed in our environment.
17The ￿rst order condition with respect to yH can be written as
n





and the ￿rst order condition with respect to yL, as
n





To interpret these two conditions, suppose (counterfactually) that ￿ were zero, that is, that
the incentive compatibility constraint did not bind. In that case, the two conditions would
collapse to u0(yH +T) = u0(yL +T), that is, yH = yL. This means that the ￿rm would pay the
same amount to workers regardless of their productivity. This would be the case not because
the ￿rm cares about equity, but because it would be the cheapest way to pay workers their
outside option of U￿.
It is apparent, then, that the need to provide incentives for e⁄ort creates a wedge between
yH and yL which is costly to the ￿rm. In the ￿rst order conditions above, that wedge is induced
by a positive multiplier ￿, which reduces u0(yH +T) relative to u0(yL +T), and hence increases
yH over yL. (See Propositions 2 and its corollary below.)
Lastly, the ￿rst order condition with respect to e⁄ort, after using incentive compatibility, is
n￿
0(a)[p(1 ￿ ￿)F
0(n‘(a))(lH ￿ lL) ￿ (yH ￿ yL)] = ￿￿
0(a) (7)
The left hand side is the increase in expected pro￿t of a marginal increase in a. The right
hand side is the marginal cost of the incentive compatibility constraint: a small increase in a
implies that the di⁄erence between u(yH +T) and u(yL +T) must increase by ￿0(a). To obtain
the associated cost, we multiply ￿0(a) by the shadow cost of the incentive constraint, ￿.
Some properties of the solution now emerge. First, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
imply that ￿ ￿ 0. Intuitively, the marginal value on pro￿ts of increasing the reservation utility
18U￿, given by ￿￿, cannot be positive. The next propositions characterize additional properties
of the optimal contract.
Proposition 1: The IR constraint is binding.
Proposition 2: The IC constraint multiplier ￿ > 0.
Proofs of both Propositions are given in the Appendix.
Corollary: The optimal contract is monotone, that is, yH > yL.
Proof: Rearranging (5) and (6), and using ￿ > 0 gives u0 (yH + T) < u0 (yL + T). The
strict concavity of the utility function then implies yH > yL.
We now consider the industry equilibrium. Because all ￿rms are equal, in equilibrium
n = N and fyH;yLg = fy￿
H;y￿
Lg. In addition, the government collects taxes and rebates them
lump-sum to the workers. Thus, the government budget constraint is
TN = ￿ fp(1 ￿ ￿)F(N‘(a)) ￿ N [￿(a)y
￿
H + (1 ￿ ￿(a))y
￿
L]g + ￿pF(N‘(a)) (8)
Collecting results, the system of six equations (3 - 8), with n = N and fyH;yLg = fy￿
H;y￿
Lg;
determine the six fy￿
H;y￿
L;a￿;T ￿;￿;￿g: The solution implies that the average worker has utility:










Note that, just like in the state ownership regime, UP and the industry equilibrium under
private ownership depend on the resource price p, which a⁄ects the set of equations (3 - 8).
For future reference, we de￿ne the before-dividend-tax indirect return function of the ￿rm,








193.4 E¢ ciency and Welfare
Positive e⁄ort under private ownership (see proposition 2) implies that e⁄ective labor and
production is greater than under state ownership. In this sense, the model is consistent with
the stylized facts that privatized ￿rms are generally more e¢ cient than state ones. This also
means that workers can have higher average consumption in a privatized regime. However,
pro￿ts are partially appropriated by private owners and there is costly consumption inequality.
The constraint ￿ < 1 is crucial to obtain a non-trivial tradeo⁄ between the national and
private regimes. In particular, if dividend taxes converge to 1 and sales taxes are set to zero,
the government is able to attain the ex-ante constrained-e¢ cient allocation under a private
ownership regime. In e⁄ect, the private regime acts as a commitment device which, together
with the right taxes, implements the second best allocation. This is summarized in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3: A private-ownership regime with ￿ = 0 and ￿ ! 1 attains the ex-ante
constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
Proof: See Appendix
For the rest of the paper we maintain the realistic assumption that dividend taxes are strictly
below one. This is also the only sensible option, if only because in the full dynamic model no
privatization would ever be possible if potential buyer know that they will pay a one hundred
percent tax on their pro￿ts.
Under this assumption, there are two opposing forces at any price p. On the one hand, a state
ownership regime induces perfect risk sharing across workers, but at the cost of low aggregate
productivity. On the other hand, by providing incentives to exert e⁄ort, private ￿rms are able
to achieve higher labor productivity. This higher output together with the lump-sum transfers
obtained from the taxation of sales and pro￿ts bene￿t not only high ability workers but also
the low ability ones. However, because private owners appropriate a fraction of total pro￿ts
￿ and the possible existence of distortionary sales taxes￿the allocation under private ownership
20regime is not constrained e¢ cient creating a non trivial tradeo⁄ between the private and state
ownership regimes.
3.5 Numerical Explorations
Further insight on the properties of the model can be obtained by resorting to numerical meth-
ods. We view our numerical experiments as providing further insights into the working of the
model and not as a realistic parametrization of any privatization - nationalization episode; our
model is too stylized for that purpose. In any case, however, we will calibrate the model to
obtain durations of privatization and nationalization regimes that resemble those observed in
Bolivia during the last decades. This issue is discussed in more detail when we describe the
computation of the dynamic version of our model.
We make assumptions about functional forms and parameter values that generate predic-
tions that are qualitatively consistent with the empirical regularities discussed in section 2.
We then perturb these parameters and analyze how changes in the environment impact the
equilibrium of the model.






where ￿ > 0 is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion; a cost of e⁄ort function given by
￿(a) = ’a
2=2,
where ’ > 0; a Cobb-Douglas production function,
F(L) = AL
￿;
where A is the level of productivity and 0 < ￿ < 1; and a function transforming e⁄ort into
21probabilities of drawing high labor endowment given by
Pr(li = lHja) = ￿(a) = 1 ￿ ￿e
￿￿a;
where 0 < ￿ < 1 measures the probability of low endowment when e⁄ort is zero and ￿ > 0
measures the sensitivity of the probability to changes in e⁄ort.
In our baseline parameterization, the labor endowment of a worker that draws high pro-
ductivity is lH = 1, and that of a worker with low productivity is lL = 0:1. That is, high labor
endowment workers are ten times more productive that low labor endowment workers. The
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is set at ￿ = 2:5, and the cost of e⁄ort parameter is ’ = 1.
We assume that the probability of drawing low productivity if e⁄ort is zero is ￿ = 0:99, and
the sensitivity of this probability to changes in e⁄ort is ￿ = 2. The level of technology is set
at A = 0:15, total population is N = 1, and the exponent on labor in the production function
is ￿ = 0:66. Finally, taxes are set at ￿ = 0:30 and ￿ = 0:30. Table 1 summarizes the baseline
parametrization.
Given these assumptions, it is straightforward to solve for the outcome of the state ownership
regime. The private ownership regime is a little more involved, as its solution is only given
in implicit form by the system (3 - 8). The computation of equilibrium is described in the
Appendix.
In all cases that we computed, we found two threshold prices p << p￿ that partition the
set of prices [0;1) so that, for all prices below p and above p￿, welfare is larger under a state
ownership regime, while for all prices between p and p￿, welfare is larger in a private ownership
regime. The threshold p, however, is always very close to zero (never greater than one) and
disappears in the dynamic version of the model as soon as we introduce a cost of nationalizing
the industry. For that reason, we focus only on the regions (p;p￿) and (p￿;1), which we refer
to as the "low price" region and the "high price" region.9
9At very low prices, those below p, private ￿rms have few incentives to di⁄erentiate workers. In e⁄ect, as
the price approaches zero, the optimal contract requires agents to exert zero e⁄ort. But if e⁄ort approaches
zero, productivity under private ownership approaches productivity under state ownership. Therefore, state
22If p is in the low price region, the private regime is worth more to the country than the
national regime. The government would accept less risk sharing in exchange for the higher
average labor productivity that prevails in a private ownership regime. On the other hand, if
the commodity price is above p￿, the elimination of income inequality becomes more important,
as more output is appropriated by private owners making concerns for e¢ ciency less of an issue.
In e⁄ect, higher commodity prices can be thought of as substituting for the low productivity
in a state ownership regime. An implication is that pressures for national ownership are likely
to grow at large values of p; which is consistent with the facts described in section 2.
Table 2 reports exercises on comparative statics to analyze how the threshold p￿ changes as
we change parameter values. The ￿rst row of the table reports the threshold price of the baseline
parametrization. An inspection of the table reveals that all parameters have a monotonic
relation with the privatization threshold p￿.10
Consider ￿rst the impact of changes in the preference parameters ￿ and ’. Table 2 shows
that the threshold p￿ is decreasing in the risk aversion parameter ￿. As workers become more
risk averse, the welfare costs associated with the lack of risk sharing in a private ownership
regime increase and, therefore, the set of prices for which a state ownership regime is superior
than the private regime increases as well; that is, p￿ decreases. Likewise, p￿ is decreasing in the
cost of e⁄ort parameter ’ . Intuitively, as the cost of e⁄ort increases, ￿rms need to increase
the ￿ punishment￿to workers with low labor endowment to induce them to exert e⁄ort. Hence,
the lack of risk-sharing becomes more costly which reduces the nationalization threshold p￿.
Consider next the impact of changes in the probability of success parameters ￿ and ￿. The
parameter ￿ measures the probability of drawing a low labor endowment when e⁄ort is zero.
An increase in ￿ has two e⁄ects: ￿rst, it reduces the value of a state ownership regime because
aggregate labor declines, and second, it increases the incentives to exert e⁄ort in a privatized
regime because the probability of drawing high labor endowment when e⁄ort is low declines.
ownership becomes welfare superior for p close to zero, as all production is distributed to the workers, while
under private ownership ￿rms take part of the pro￿ts.
10Table 2 does not report changes in A. The reason is that in the nationalization-privatization choice, only
the product Ap matters. Thus, an increase in A immediately implies that p￿ declines.
23Thus, ￿rms are able to induce workers to exert the same amount of e⁄ort with a smaller
dispersion in wages. Both e⁄ects imply that p￿ is increasing in ￿. Likewise, p￿ is increasing
in the sensitivity parameter ￿. As ￿ increases, a marginal increase in e⁄ort induces a larger
increase in the probability of success, which makes exerting e⁄ort more attractive to workers
and, therefore, easier for ￿rms to provide incentives. Thus, the bene￿ts of a privatized regime
increases with ￿.
We now consider the sensitivity of the threshold price p￿ to changes in the relative productiv-
ity of high and low productivity workers assuming that the average labor supply in a state-owned
regime ￿ that is, when e⁄ort is zero￿remains constant. Note that these mean preserving changes
do not a⁄ect welfare in a state-ownership regime but they do in a private ownership regime: an
increase in the relative productivity of highly productive workers increases the e¢ ciency gains
of di⁄erentiating workers through a more unequal payment schedule. In other words, a mean
preserving spread in labor endowment makes a private ownership regime more e¢ cient but also
more unequal. Suppose that instead of being ten times for productive, high ability workers are
￿ve times more productive than low ability workers ￿ that is, lH=lL decreases from 10 to 5. The
threshold price p￿ decreases from 40.1 to 27. In e⁄ect, ￿rms in a privately owned regime have
less incentives to di⁄erentiate workers ￿ and, therefore, increase productivity relative to a state
ownership regime￿because the relative gain of doing so is now lower. Thus, p￿ declines.
The threshold price p￿ is increasing in the technology parameter ￿. Intuitively, as ￿ increases
the technology becomes more ￿ linear￿and, therefore, the degree of decreasing marginal product
of labor decreases with ￿. In other words, the bene￿ts of inducing workers to exert e⁄ort
increases with ￿. Thus p￿increases as well.
Finally, consider a change in the tax code, as summarized by changes in dividend and sales
taxes. An increase in the dividend tax ￿ increases the lump-sum transfers to the workers in a
private ownership regime. This increase in T has two e⁄ects: ￿rst, more income is redistributed
from the ￿rms to the workers, and second, the di⁄erential in labor income between high and
low ability workers becomes less important as their relative total income (including lump-sum
24transfers) becomes more equal. Thus, the welfare losses associated with consumption inequality
in a private ownership regime decline, making private ownership more desirable, as re￿ ected
by a higher p￿.11 Likewise, p￿ is increasing in the sales tax ￿. A change in the sales tax has
a similar impact as an increase in ￿ in terms of the change in incentives through the increase
in lump-sum transfers T. The change in ￿, however, has an additional impact on the ￿rm￿ s
behavior, since from a ￿rm￿ s point of view, a higher ￿ is equivalent to a lower price p. Each
￿rm must reduce wages (yH and yL), which implies again that transfers are a higher share of
each workers￿income, reducing consumption inequality under private ownership.
4 The Dynamics of Privatization and Nationalization
4.1 Multiperiod Version of the Model
In this section we study the full dynamic version of the model. Time is discrete and denoted by
t = 0;1;:::;1. Workers are in￿nitely lived and discount future utilities with the discount factor
￿. Firms are also in￿nitely lived and discount future pro￿ts with the discount factor 1=(1+r).
To simplify the model, we assume that workers cannot borrow or save.
The price of the economy￿ s resource is now assumed to follow an exogenous Markov process,
which is the only source of aggregate uncertainty and dynamics. The timing of events is as
follows. We say that the industry was privatized in period t ￿ 1 if, at the end of that period,
￿rms were privately owned. Otherwise, we say that the industry was in a state ownership
regime. At the beginning of period t, the price pt is realized, and then the government decides
whether to keep the regime the same or to switch to the other regime. After the privatization
- nationalization decision is made, production and consumption take place.
As before, we assume that the government is benevolent in that it maximizes the welfare of
the average worker. Here, though, the government￿ s regime choice is an intertemporal decision
11In contrast with a competitive industry, a change in ￿ does a⁄ect the decisions of ￿rms because it modi￿es
the incentive compatibility constraint of workers through a change in the lump-sum transfer T
25problem, in which the stochastic behavior of the price pt needs to be taken into consideration
in relation with various costs and bene￿ts.
Our results in the preceding section can now be regarded as the one-period equilibrium
industry outcomes under either private ownership or state ownership. In particular, we showed
how to compute the average worker￿ s payo⁄s under either regime, UP and US respectively, and
how those payo⁄s depend on the price pt:
To complete the speci￿cation of the dynamic setting, we assume that changing regime entails
a direct cost or bene￿t. To be precise, we assume that nationalizing the industry (switching
from private ownership to state ownership) is associated with a one period loss of cS goods.
This cost is assumed to be exogenous and interpretable as the deadweight loss resulting from a
political backlash or international sanctions following nationalization.
Likewise, privatizing the industry results in a temporary boost to government revenues due
to the proceeds from selling state ￿rms. We assume that the government makes a take-it or
leave-it o⁄er to a measure one of incumbent ￿rms in exchange for the rights to operate in
the industry. Competitive bidders drive the o⁄er up to the ￿rm￿ s value and, therefore, the
government extracts all the rents. We assume that a fraction 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 of these rents are
transferred lump-sum to the current workers. The remaining fraction is a loss that can be
interpreted as the cost of reorganizing the industry, selling the ￿rms, corruption, and the like.
Under our assumptions, dynamic behavior is relatively easy to characterize in recursive
form. Let VP(p) denote the value for the government at the end of a period in which the price
is p and the regime ends up being private ownership, and has been in private ownership for at
least one period. Likewise, let V 0
P(p) denote the value for the government at the end of a period
in which the industry is privatized (after having been state owned the previous period) and the
price is p. Similar de￿nitions hold for VS (p), the value in a state ownership regime, and V 0
S(p),
the value in a period in which the industry is nationalized.
26Then, the function VP(p) satis￿es the Bellman equation








where Q(p;A) = Prfpt+1 2 Ajpt = pg is the transition function governing the price process,
and p0 is next period￿ s price. The interpretation is straightforward: the value of a privatized
regime is today￿ s payo⁄ to the average worker, UP(p), plus the discounted value of tomorrow￿ s
option to continue in the privatized regime, VP (p0), or to nationalize the industry, V 0
S(p0).
Similarly, the value in a state ownership regime VS(p) satis￿es








In periods of regime change, that is, when the industry is just privatized or just nationalized,



























S(p) denote the static payo⁄s in the privatization period and nationalization
period respectively.









We now describe the payo⁄in a privatization period, U0
P(p). To that end, let W 0(p) denote
the value of a private ￿rm in the privatization period, and let W(p) denote the value of the ￿rm
in subsequent periods. These functions are di⁄erent because the additional lump-sum transfer
at the privatization period modi￿es the incentives to exert e⁄ort.
27The function W(p) satis￿es the recursive equation








where ￿ = fp0 : VP(p0) ￿ V 0
S(p0)g is the set of prices tomorrow for which the industry remains
private, and R(p) is the ￿rm￿ s before-dividend-tax pro￿t function. In computing the present
discounted value of the ￿rm tomorrow, we are considering only those prices for which the ￿rm
will not be nationalized in the next period, ￿.
Likewise, the value of the ￿rm in a privatization period is given by
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where R0(p) is the ￿rm￿ s before-dividend-tax pro￿t function at the privatization period.
We obtain the static payo⁄ U0
P(p) and the pro￿t function R0(p) by solving the static equi-
librium with private ownership including the transfer from selling the ￿rms. This static equi-
librium is identical to the one described in section 3.3, except that here the government budget
constraint (8) includes an additional source of funds, ￿W 0(p), raised from selling state ￿rms:
pF(N‘(a0))[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿] ￿ ￿N [￿(a0)yH0 + (1 ￿ ￿(a0))yL0] + ￿W
0(p) = T0N
Once we have the equilibrium allocation, we compute the static payo⁄s
U
0
P(p) = ￿(a0)u(yH0 + T0) + (1 ￿ ￿(a0))u(yL0 + T0) ￿ ￿(a0)
and
R
0(p) = p(1 ￿ ￿)F(N‘(a0)) ￿ N[￿(a0)yH0 + (1 ￿ ￿(a0))yL0]:
Given UP, US, U0
P, U0
S, and the law of motion for p; the dynamic equilibrium is given by
solutions VP, VS, V 0
P, and V 0
S of the four functional equations (9), (10), (11), and (12). For an
28interesting range of parameters, the solution is illustrated in Figure 2. The functions VP and







From (9), p￿ is the price at which the government is exactly indi⁄erent between nationalizing
a privately owned industry or leaving it in private hands. As long as the price is below p￿, the
government refrains from nationalization, while nationalization occurs if the price jumps above
p￿.






From (10), p￿￿ is the price at which the government is indi⁄erent between privatizing a state
owned sector or not. Hence, if the industry is under state ownership, it will remains in that
regime as long as pt is above p￿￿: Privatization occurs, however, if pt falls under p￿￿.
In equilibriums of the form just described, there is a range of prices pt 2 (p￿￿;p￿) for which
the industry could be either in private ownership or state ownership regime depending on the
previous history of prices. That is, this model features a form of hysteresis the sense that the
ownership regime in period t depends not only on the current price pt but also on the history
of prices p0;p1;:::;pt￿1 leading to pt . This is a consequence of the gap in the value functions
due to the nationalization costs and privatization bene￿ts represented by cS and ￿.
4.2 Dynamic Implications
In addition to the functional forms used in section 3.5, we assume the following stochastic
process for the price,
pt = ￿ pexp(zt);
29where zt follows a stationary ￿rst order autoregressive process,
zt = ￿zt￿1 + "t; j￿j < 1 and "t ￿ N(0;￿
2):
Under this assumption, the price pt is log-normal with a stationary distribution that has mean




and variance V AR(pt) = ￿ p2 ￿
exp ~ ￿2 ￿ 1
￿
exp ~ ￿2, where ~ ￿2 = ￿2=(1 ￿ ￿2)
is the variance of the stationary distribution of zt.
We interpret a period in the model to be one year, and set the parameters that determine
the evolution of the price pt by running a ￿rst order autoregression on the logarithm of real
yearly crude oil prices.12 The point estimates of these regressions are ￿ = 0:89, ￿ = 0:24, and
￿ p = 54:6. Thus, the expected value and standard deviation of the invariant distribution of the
price pt are 62:8 and 35:5 respectively.
It remains to set the parameters ￿, r, ￿, and cS. We choose these parameters (and those
common with the static model) to imply privatization and nationalization cycles of similar
duration to those observed in Bolivia ￿ historically, a state ownership regime in Bolivia lasts
between 20 and 25 years while private ownership, between 12 and 15 years. We assume a
subjective discount factor of ￿ = 0:95 and an interest rate of r = 0:1. We assume that 50
percent of the resources raised at the privatization period are redistributed to the workers, so
that ￿ = 0:5. A reasonable value for the nationalization cost cS is more di¢ cult to choose.
Here we simply assume that the nationalization cost is such that if the commodity price is 30
percent of its long-run average value, namely 0:3E(pt), consumption in a state ownership regime
is zero. This implies cS = 0:3E(pt)F(LS). For our baseline calibration, the nationalization cost
is cS = 0:64, which represent about 31 percent of the value of production at the nationalization
price p￿. These parameters are reported in Table 1.
Table 3 reports numerical experiments based on the dynamic model. The table displays the
privatization and nationalization trigger prices p￿￿ and p￿, and the average duration of each
12Oil prices are average annual prices per barrel of oil, in constant 2008 U.S. Dollars. Adjustment for in￿ ation
is obtained using the U.S. consumer price index. The spot oil price correspond to the West Texas Intermediate,
as reported by Dow Jones & Company.
30regime. To be precise, we de￿ne the duration of a state ownership regime as the average number
of years for the ￿rst time a price starting at pt = p￿ reaches p￿￿. We note, however, that the
proposed statistic is a lower bound on the duration of the regime, for the initial price could
start at a value above p￿. Likewise, we de￿ne the duration of a privately owned regime as the
average number of periods for the price to move from p￿￿ to p￿. These statistics are computed
using Montecarlo simulations and depend on the model parameters only through the invariant
distribution of prices and the thresholds p￿ and p￿￿.
The ￿rst row of the table reports the thresholds prices and duration statistics of the baseline
parametrization. In this economy, the industry is state-owned at all prices greater than p￿ =
60:4 and privately-owned at all prices smaller than p￿￿ = 36:7. The average duration of a state
ownership regime is 22 years and that of a private ownership regime is 14 years.
Consider an increase in risk aversion from the baseline ￿ = 2:5 to ￿ = 3. Both threshold
prices decline, the average duration of a state ownership regime increases substantially and that
of a privately ownership regime decreases slightly. The intuition for the change in the threshold
prices is similar to that in the static model: an increase in risk aversion makes a state owned
regime more appealing due to the larger costs associated with the lack of risk sharing in a
privately owned regime. To understand the changes in the duration statistics, note that the
stationary distribution of prices do not change but the threshold prices are now p￿￿ = 29:4 and
p￿ = 54:1. Because prices are mean reverting, clearly the time it takes for the price to move
from 29:4 to 54:1 will be substantially smaller than the time it will take to go from 54:1 to 29:4
for the simple reason that the average price is above both threshold prices.
The intuition for the changes in threshold prices due to changes in the parameters ’, ￿, ￿,
lL=lH, ￿, ￿, ￿, and A is similar to that discussed in the static model. These changes together
with the observation that the invariant distribution of prices remains the same in all experiments
provide intuition for the changes in the duration statistics. Consider, for example, a decrease
in the ratio lH=lL from 10 to 5 keeping the same average labor supply when e⁄ort is zero.
This change implies a decline in both threshold prices, with the privatization threshold being
31just p￿￿ = 25:7 and the nationalization threshold, p￿ = 51:7. It is clear that it will take a
long time for a mean reverting process with average value of 62:8 to move from 51:7 to 25:7.
This observation explains that the average duration of a state-owned regime is about 53 years.
On the other hand, the mean reverting property of the price process implies that the average
duration of a private ownership regime is reduced to 13 years.
We now consider changes in the parameters that are speci￿c to the dynamic model. Con-
sider, ￿rst, an increase in the nationalization cost cS to 0:86.13 The nationalization threshold
p￿ increases from 60:4 to 67:8 and the privatization threshold p￿￿ decreases from 36:7 to 36:2
It is clear why p￿ increases: because the nationalization cost is higher, the welfare loss asso-
ciated with the lack of risk sharing of a privately owned regime that justi￿es nationalizating
the industry must be larger. This, in turn, implies that p￿ increases. Note, however, that
although the nationalization cost is paid only at the nationalization period and, therefore, it
mainly a⁄ects the value function in a state-owned regime, the privatization threshold changes
as well. The reason for this change is the indirect negative impact that an increase in cS has on
the value of a private ownership regime due to the possibility of future nationalizations of the
industry. In any case, however, changes in cS have a much larger impact on the nationalization
threshold p￿ than on the privatization threshold p￿￿. In terms of duration, the increase in p￿ and
the decrease in p￿￿ imply that each regime lasts longer. Indeed, the average duration of a state
owned regime increases from 22 years to 24 years, and that of a state privately owned regime
14 to 18 years. Clearly, the duration of the private ownership regime increases substantially
more than that of a state-owned regime.
Consider next a change in the privatization bene￿t ￿. Assume that ￿ declines from 0:5
to 0:25, so that 75 percent of the bene￿ts of privatizing the industry are lost or are used for
purposes other than transferences. On a qualitative level, this change has the same impact as
an increase in the nationalization cost cS ￿ both imply a higher loss of resources. The di⁄erence
being that a drop in ￿ operates through a change in the value of a private ownership regime
13The cost cS = 0:86 implies that about 37 percent of the value of output is used to pay the costs associated
with nationalizating the industry when the commodity price is pt = p￿.
32at the privatization period while an increase in cS operates through a change in the value of
a state ownership regime at the nationalization period. Thus, p￿￿ decreases, p￿ increases, and
the average duration of each regime increases as well.
The last two experiments involve perturbing the persistence and the volatility of the stochastic
process zt. Because these changes a⁄ect the invariant distribution of pt, the interpretation of the
results must be taken with caution. In all cases, we adjust ￿ p so that the invariant distribution
of pt has always the same mean of E (pt) = 62:8. However, there are no enough parameters to
simultaneously adjust the mean and standard deviation of pt. Thus, changes in the persistence
parameter ￿ necessarily involves changes in the volatility of pt.
Consider a mean preserving change in the persistence parameter ￿. A decline in persistence
from 0:89 to 0:5 increases the privatization threshold p￿￿ from 36:7 to 40:5 and the nationaliz-
ation threshold p￿ from 60:4 to 63:4.14 The mean preserving decline in persistence leads to the
somewhat counterintuitive result that the duration of each regime decreases. Intuition suggest
that the less persistent the price, the more likely the price will cross the trigger prices. How-
ever, the standard deviation of the invariant distribution of prices decreases substantially as
the persistence parameter ￿ decreases. This drop in the volatility in prices explains the increase
in the duration of each regime.
The last experiment consists of a mean preserving spread in the distribution of prices.
We increase the volatility ￿ from 0:24 to 0:48 adjusting ￿ p so that the expected long-run price
remains constant. Both threshold prices decline, the duration of state ownership regime declines
substantially and that of private ownership does not change. Intuition suggests that duration
of a privately owned regime should decrease as well. In e⁄ect, if the model is calibrated on a
monthly basis we do observe a decline of a few months in the duration of a privately owned
regime. The yearly frequency of the model is too coarse to capture the shorter duration.
14Neither p￿ nor p￿￿, however, move monotonically with (mean preserving) changes in ￿.
334.3 Discussion
It is worth stressing the ways in which the model is consistent with the ￿ve stylized facts
identi￿ed in our empirical review in section 2:
As to Fact 1, the dynamic model clearly stresses the repeated, cyclical nature of privatization
- nationalization episodes. In the model, the choice between state versus private ownership
re￿ ects an underlying equity-e¢ ciency tradeo⁄, which is a⁄ected in a natural way by the price
of the national resource. Also, while we have modeled a single country in isolation, note
that because the resource price is presumably common to many producer countries, the model
is clearly consistent with the observation that privatization episodes often involve multiple
countries.
With respect to Fact 2, our analysis is not necessarily restricted to a speci￿c sector, but
it does focus on factors that are likely to be more prevalent in natural resource sectors than
in alternative ones. The model, in particular, assigns a key role to the movements in the
international price of the national resource. In the model, also, the exploitation of the resource
is the main (indeed the only) productive activity of the domestic economy. These two features
are typical of economies based on the exploitation and export of natural resources.
Fact 3 is reproduced by the model, as its calibrated versions easily imply that nationaliza-
tions happen when the price of the domestic resource is high. This occurs because, when prices
are high, concerns about equity become relatively more pressing.
Privatizations occur in our model when prices fall below a threshold value. If prices sub-
sequently increase, the resulting windfalls are appropriated, partly or wholly, by the private
buyers, until the price increase triggers nationalization. In this sense, the model is consistent
with Fact 4. But it also reveals more. The fact that private owners can bene￿t from price
bonanzas in a privatized regime is necessary for the resource to have been previously sold by
the state. By construction, in our model private owners do not appropriate supranormal pro￿ts,
so that their pro￿tability when prices are high is only compensating them for below market
pro￿ts when prices are low.
34In the model, nationalization occurs when inequality becomes relatively more important for
social welfare. At the same time, nationalization happens as pro￿ts of the privately owned
￿rm are at their highest. Hence, the model can explain Fact 5. But note, again, that in
the model private owners do make normal pro￿ts even after accounting for the possibility of
expropriation. Indeed, the price at which the owners acquire the resource in the ￿rst place does
take into account the fact that nationalization will occur when the price increases su¢ ciently.
Also, note that in our model inequality lowers social welfare because of risk aversion. In-
creases in the risk aversion coe¢ cient may therefore capture a stronger concern for inequality.
If this interpretation is valid, the model does deliver the correct prediction in that increased
risk aversion makes state ownership and nationalizations more likely.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have argued that privatization - nationalization cycles can be usefully regarded as the resol-
ution of an equity-e¢ ciency tradeo⁄. In our model, that tradeo⁄is generated by a conventional
moral hazard problem. Our theory has intuitive implications, both static and dynamic, and
can be extended in several directions.
An implicit assumption underlying our theory is that, in a privatized regime, workers cannot
pool wage income risks among themselves. This is a natural assumption and is consistent with
the view that countries that display privatization - nationalization cycles are likely to su⁄er
from ￿nancial frictions as well. In this regard, one can reinterpret our analysis of changes in
risk aversion parameters as attempts to capture what would happen if ￿nancial imperfections
were less binding. The theory would then say that ￿nancial development would reduce the
incentives for nationalization. Of course, future research would be desirable to ￿ esh out this
connection.
The theory highlights that cycles of nationalization and privatization are, ultimately, linked
to the government￿ s inability, under a nationalized regime, not to redistribute income among
35domestic workers. In this sense, our theory implies that institutional improvements, here the
ability of the government to commit in advance to a (non-) redistributive policy, may help
eliminating privatization - nationalization cycles. Conversely, our theory de-emphasizes other
explanations, such as political con￿ ict, that have received attention in this context.
Admittedly, though, more research appears to be warranted to ￿ esh out these and other
policy implications of the theory. It is likely that some of the elements that we have taken as
exogenous in our model, such as the structure of capital markets or the costs of nationalization,
are related to policy instruments and institutions. If so, the analysis of this paper could be rein-
terpreted as tracing the impact of changes in those policies and institutions. Clearly, however,
making such a reinterpretation would require a more detailed speci￿cation of the fundamentals
of the economy.
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40Table 1. Baseline Parameters
Symbol Description Value
A Productivity 0.15
￿ Labor exponent (technology) 0.66
￿ Coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion 2.5
’ Cost of e⁄ort parameter 1
￿ Probability of success parameter 0.99
￿ Probability of success parameter 2
lH High labor endowment 1
lL Low labor endowment 0.1
￿ Dividend Tax 0.30
￿ Sales Tax 0.30
Additional parameters of the dynamic model
￿ Persistence of log-price 0.89
￿ Standard deviation of log-price 0.24
￿ p Parameter in price evolution 54.6
￿ Discount factor (annualized) 0.95
r Interest rate (annualized) 0.10
cS Nationalization cost (level) 0.64
￿ Privatization bene￿t (fraction) 0.50
41Table 2: Static Model
Symbol Description Value p￿
￿ Baseline Economy ￿ 40.1
￿ Risk Aversion 2 53.5
3 31.6
’ E⁄ort parameter 0.5 48.6
1.5 35.1
￿ Probability of success parameter 0.9 6.9
￿ Probability of success parameter 1.5 32.9
2.5 45.4
lH=lL Ratio of labor endowments 5 27.0
(mean preserving) 20 49.4
￿ Labor exponent in technology 0.5 17.8
0.75 55.8
￿ Dividend tax 0.1 35.8
0.5 45.3
￿ Sales tax 0.1 35.8
0.5 44.9
42Table 3: Dynamic Model
Symbol Description Value Thresholds Average Duration of Regime
p￿￿ p￿ State-owned Private
￿ Baseline Economy ￿ 36.7 60.4 22 14
￿ Risk Aversion 2 48.3 70.4 13 16
3 29.4 54.1 38 13
’ E⁄ort parameter 0.5 44.1 66.9 15 15
1.5 32.4 56.7 29 14
￿ Prob. of success parameter 0.9 18.5 45.6 164 13
Prob. of success parameter 1.5 30.6 55.2 35 13
2.5 41.5 64.6 17 14
lH=lL Ratio of labor endowments 5 25.7 51.7 53 13
(mean preserving) 20 45.2 67.8 14 15
￿ Labor exponent (techn.) 0.5 17.6 42.3 196 12
0.75 50.0 74.3 12 17
￿ Dividend tax 0.2 34.9 57.8 24 13
0.4 38.7 63.4 21 14
￿ Sales tax 0.2 34.9 57.8 25 13
0.4 38.7 63.4 21 14
A Productivity 0.1 53.4 75.0 10 17
0.2 28.1 53.0 43 13
cS Nationalization cost 0.43 37.4 52.6 18 10
0.86 36.2 67.8 25 18
￿ Privatization bene￿t 0.25 36.4 62.4 23 15
0.75 36.9 59.5 21 13
￿ Persistence of shock 0.5 40.5 63.4 20 4
(mean preserving) 0.95 35.7 59.6 24 24
￿ Volatility of shock 0.12 38.1 58.2 96 14
(mean preserving) 0.24 31.2 58.0 10 14
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Figure 2. Value Functions and Threshold Prices
45A Additional Case Studies
A.1 Venezuela
Venezuela is another Latin American country with vast hydrocarbon reserves, which has un-
dergone alternating cycles of nationalization and privatization. Its cycles have generally been
more protracted than Bolivia￿ s, however; probably because Venezuela relied much more heavily
on pro￿t taxes￿ as opposed to ￿xed royalties￿ to raise revenue. The government raised the
percentage of pro￿ts it would expropriate in incremental steps, resulting in relatively extended
privatization and nationalization cycles. Despite Venezuela￿ s more gradual transitions, the sub-
stantial ￿ uctuations in international oil prices were frequently accompanied by a tumultuous
and dynamic political environment.
Oil was ￿rst discovered in Venezuela in 1907. Its exploration and production dominated
economic activity shortly thereafter; and by 1928, it had become the world￿ s leading petroleum
exporter. Under the dictatorial rule of General Juan Vicente G￿mez, the Standard Oil Company
and the Royal Dutch Oil Company operated uninterrupted in Venezuela for 23 years. After
a brief interlude during which the government made no new petroleum concessions, Venezuela
enacted the 1943 Petroleum Law. Although the law substantially increased government revenues
from oil pro￿ts, it also encouraged future development e⁄orts by extending existing concessions
for almost 40 years.
In 1945 R￿mulo Betancourt and the Democratic Action Party gained control of the govern-
ment. They promulgated a new constitution that granted universal su⁄rage and legalized all
political parties. In addition, the 1943 Petroleum law was overhauled to assure the government
a 50 percent tax on the oil industry￿ s pro￿ts. The reforms met with strong opposition and
in 1948 the government was overthrown by a military coup. Marcos PØrez JimenØz assumed
dictatorial control and voided the 1947 constitution. PØrez was a strong supporter of foreign
oil companies, but his repressive regime undertook numerous expensive and ostentatious con-
struction projects. When he was ￿nally ousted in 1958, he ￿ ed to the U.S. stealing $250 million
46from his country￿ s treasury and leaving over $500 million in foreign debt.
1958 marked an important turning point in Venezuela￿ s history. Betancourt was elected
to power and implemented a series of reforms designed to induce prolonged institutional and
political stability. Although he increased the government￿ s take of oil pro￿ts from 50 to 60
percent, the ruling parties all agreed to respect the principles of capital accumulation and the
sanctity of private property rights. In 1960, the Corporaci￿n Venezolana de Petr￿leos (CVP)
was founded in order to oversee the exploration, extraction, re￿nement, and delivery of the
country￿ s hydrocarbons. In that same year, Venezuela founded the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). An international cartel including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
and Iran, OPEC was designed as a means of ensuring its member countries￿welfare by ￿xing
the world price of oil.
In 1969 Rafael Caldera was elected president. Rising oil prices and continued political
stability resulted in robust economic growth. In 1971 Caldera raised the oil pro￿t tax rate
to 70 percent and passed the Hydrocarbons Reversion Law. The new law stated that all oil
company assets would revert to the state once their concessions expired. Caldera was peacefully
succeeded by Carlos AndrØs PØrez in 1973. In that same year, OPEC members agreed to a
12 percent increase in oil prices and three years later Petr￿leos de Venezuela (PDVSA) was
founded.
On January 1, 1976, Venezuela nationalized its entire petroleum industry. Foreign oil com-
panies mounted little resistance. The move had been fully anticipated, the companies had
received no new concessions since 1960, their share of pro￿ts had already been cut to just
30 percent, and the government compensated them with $1 billion. All foreign oil companies
present in Venezuela at the time were consolidated into four autonomous entities and placed
under administrative supervision of PDVSA. Because PDVSA lacked the necessary resources
to run the entities successfully, it signed a number of service contracts with the multinational
￿rms￿subsidiaries in order to continue operations. Unprecedented oil prices continued to fuel
strong economic growth and large government revenues. These revenues were accompanied,
47however, by rampant spending, corruption, and high in￿ ation.
When world oil prices fell in the late 1970￿ s, Venezuela￿ s economy plunged into recession.
Real GDP declined, unemployment rose, high in￿ ation persisted, and the autonomous state-
owned oil companies took on excessive debts to maintain their planned investment strategies. In
1981, oil prices continued to fall and OPEC members responded by halving production. Figure
2.a illustrates the steep price decline and 2.b shows a concurrent decrease in production. Jaime
Lusinchi became president in 1983 and responded to the deteriorating economic situation by
devaluing the currency and implementing price controls. Although the price controls helped
curb in￿ ation, uncertainty about the exchange system prompted capital ￿ ight. This exacerbated
the government￿ s foreign debt problems and it responded by appropriating PDVSA reserves.
The PDVSA became increasingly politicized, a process that severely undermined its autonomy.
Figure 2.c depicts the dramatic fall in GNI that ensued as well as the substantial percentage
increase in oil￿ s ￿scal contribution. For the next seven years, the government￿ s percentage take
of oil pro￿ts hovered between 70 and 90 percent. Despite such high percentage takes, world oil
prices fell so signi￿cantly that government revenue continued to decline. In the meantime, FDI
was practically non-existent and investment in the nationalized-industry, as measured by the
number of land and o⁄shore rigs, fell sharply (see Figure 2.b). Carlos AndrØs PØrez returned to
power in 1988 and launched an unpopular austerity program. Social unrest grew and after two
unsuccessful coup attempts to remove him, Congress impeached PØrez on corruption charges.
PØrez was succeeded by Rafael Caldera in 1994. As evident in Figure 2.a, oil prices had
fallen steadily and were almost 70 percent lower than they had been in 1980. FDI was still
relatively low and the rig count was below its 1982 average (see Figure 2.b). Figure 2.c shows
that GNI was still depressed but that inequality had also decreased signi￿cantly ￿ the Gini
coe¢ cient was over 25 percent lower than it had been in 1981. In addition, the oil pro￿ts￿
percent of ￿scal contribution to government revenue had fallen dramatically from its high in
1991. In this economic climate, Caldera implemented a new business plan for PDVSA that
strove to foster multinational companies￿participation in the oil industry. The plan included
48pacts between foreign companies to initiate new oil ￿eld exploration as well as future pro￿t-
sharing agreements￿ it e⁄ectively began privatization of Venezuela￿ s struggling oil industry.
After privatization, Figure 2.b shows a dramatic increase in both FDI and rig count, while
oil production steadily increased. Although petroleum prices remained relatively ￿ at, and in
fact dropped in 1998, Figure 2.a shows reserves trending up. Figure 2.c depicts GNI begin-
ning to grow, but its recovery is accompanied by a concurrent increase in inequality. Al-
though the government￿ s percentage take of pro￿ts rose signi￿cantly in 1997￿ three years after
privatization￿ the increase was short-lived. In 1998 oil prices fell sharply. Annual in￿ ation
exceeded 30 percent, half the Venezuelan populace lived below the poverty line, and income
inequality continued to grow. In this environment, Hugo Chavez, a revolutionary in the failed
coups of 1992, was elected president. He had pledged to implement political and economic
reforms that would give the poor a greater share of Venezuela￿ s oil wealth. In 1999 he intro-
duced a referendum to increase presidential powers, implement six-year terms, and halt the
privatization of state assets. The referendum passed and a year later Chavez was reelected to
a six-year term.
After Chavez￿ s election, FDI and the rig count dropped precipitously (see Figure 2.b). Figure
2.a illustrates a sharp increase in world oil prices, while Figure 2.c depicts a concurrent increase
in GNI and the government￿ s percentage take of oil pro￿ts. Although Chavez garnered strong
support among the working class, his reform policies met with stubborn resistance from the
business community. In 2002 a coalition of military and business leaders successfully ousted
Chavez, but strong international criticism and fervent outpouring of support from his followers
helped him return to power within two days. Later that year, the government attempted
to assume full control of PDVSA. Business and labor organizations were strongly opposed to
the move and organized a massive retaliatory strike in January that included the petroleum
industry. Figure 2.b illustrates the resulting decline in oil production. The strike lasted nine
weeks after which the leaders conceded defeat. The government responded by ￿ring half the
workforce and assuming full political control of PDVSA, e⁄ectively nationalizing the petroleum
49industry without providing market compensation (Manzano and Monaldi, 2008). Despite the
skyrocketing oil prices evident in Figure 2.a, Figure 2.b shows a sharp decline in FDI and the
rig count immediately after nationalization. Production also fell and reserves stagnated. In
2006 Chavez was reelected with 63 percent of the vote. The following year he tightened state
control by nationalizing all of Venezuela￿ s energy and telecommunication ￿rms.
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52A.2 Zambia
While Venezuela￿ s economy is dominated by the petroleum industry, the Zambian economy is
highly reliant on copper. The mineral was ￿rst discovered in the landlocked African country
while it was still under British colonial rule and known as Northern Rhodesia. Since then,
copper production, and by extension international copper prices, have played a prominent role
in Zambia￿ s political and economic development. Zambia underwent a nationalization and
privatization cycle similar to those experienced in Bolivia and Venezuela. In Zambia, however,
the process was somewhat di⁄erent. Whereas the cycle in both Latin American countries went
from privatization in the 1990s to nationalization in this decade, Zambia￿ s cycle was more
protracted and went from nationalization to privatization.
Copper exploitation ￿rst began in Northern Rhodesia in 1889 when the British government
granted a charter to the British South African Company (BSAC). The charter gave BSAC
administrative power over the region and assigned it ownership rights to all of the country￿ s
minerals. With the onset of World War I, world copper demand grew signi￿cantly. Production
in Northern Rhodesian expanded quickly and exporting began. In 1924 local white and African
opposition to BSAC rule intensi￿ed and the company responded by ceding administrative con-
trol of the region to the British Colonial O¢ ce in London. The Colonial O¢ ce promptly set up
a legislative council in the country to which the white population elected ￿ve members. Four
years later, signi￿cant copper discoveries were made in the area now referred to as the Cop-
perbelt. The discoveries prompted an in￿ ux of new investment, but it was ￿nanced entirely by
the South African Anglo-American Corporation and the American Rhodesian Selection Trust
companies.
In 1931 world copper prices collapsed. They rose again sharply in 1935, but the local
inhabitants bene￿ted little from the increase. BSAC still owned the areas￿mineral rights and
thus exacted substantial royalty fees from the mining companies. In addition, the British
government expropriated half of the revenue the local government raised from the companies￿
remaining pro￿ts. By 1938 Northern Rhodesia supplied 13 percent of the world￿ s copper, but
53the Anglo-American Corporation and the Rhodesian Selection Trust monopolized the industry.
World War II further increased demand for copper and as a result African miners in the area
￿nally succeeded in ameliorating their working conditions. Over the next decade, copper prices
continued to ￿ uctuate drastically. In 1949 they were devalued, but by the early 1950￿ s they
had risen sharply. Mining companies in Northern Rhodesia began to pay regular dividends and
the local government ￿nally received a share of the royalties BSAC had been collecting. The
mining boom also prompted another major strike and African workers were ￿nally awarded
higher wages and greater job stability.
The copper boom ended in 1956 and in 1964 the country became the Independent Republic
of Zambia. The local government acquired all the mineral rights from BSAC and increased
its taxation rates on mining companies￿pro￿ts. As evident in Figure 3.a, copper prices rose
after independence and then stayed at relatively high levels. Figure 3.c shows that GNI also
grew steadily during this period as well. In 1968 President Kenneth Kaunda implemented the
Mulungushi reforms which founded the Industrial Development Conglomerate￿ a government
entity designed to expropriate and hold a controlling equity in a number of key foreign ￿rms.
Nationalization continued in 1970 when the government acquired majority holdings in the
two major foreign mining companies. The Anglo-American Corporation became the Nchanga
Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and the Rhodesian Selection Trust was morphed into the
Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM). These companies were held under the new parastatal body
called Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO). In 1971 the government consolidated its
holding companies under the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). As depicted
in Figure 3.b, FDI stagnated a year after nationalization.
Copper prices ￿ uctuated erratically during the early 1970￿ s. Figure 3.a depicts a substantial
plunge in 1975 followed by a downward trend until 1985. As a result, the economy contracted
signi￿cantly and protests broke out across the country. The sizeable decline in GNI is illustrated
in Figure 3.c. Rising world oil prices exacerbated Zambia￿ s economic downturn and it was forced
to look abroad for loans. Investment in the country plummeted, and as evident in Figure 3.b,
54FDI in 1981 was actually negative. In 1982 the government consolidated NCCM and RCM into
the giant Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. (ZCCM). Despite the merger, exhausting
reserves and increasing costs forced the government to cut back on mining operations, and it
closed the Kansanshi and Chambishi mines shortly thereafter. Figure 3.a illustrates the severe
depletion in reserves￿ they declined almost 50 percent between 1984 and 1988. Figure 2.b also
shows that copper production was trending down.
In 1991 Zambia held multiparty elections and President Frederick Chiluba replaced Kaunda.
With support from the IMF and World Bank, Chiluba privatized a number of government
companies, including the country￿ s copper ￿rms. Political and economic strife persisted and
mining costs continued to escalate. Despite the decline in GNI after privatization, Figure 3.c
shows a reduction in inequality. From 1991 to 1993 the Gini coe¢ cient fell over 12 percent,
and it is likely that this decrease enabled Zambia￿ s privatization process to continue. In 2000,
Chiluba further privatized the mining industry by divulging 80 percent of ZCCM. FDI jumped,
and Figure 3.b also shows a dramatic increase in production as well. A year later, copper prices
began to grow steadily (see Figure 3.a). Figure 3.b shows that FDI maintained its upward trend
and as a result production continued to grow as well. In addition, Figure 3.c reveals that GNI
began to recover from its stagnant period with a steady upward trend. It can be argued that
the high level of investments after privatization has allowed for output in Zambia to increase
even in the context of the current international crisis.
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57B Technical Appendix
B.1 Proofs
Proposition 1: The IR constraint is binding.
Proof: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose fyo
H;yo
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We propose a feasible plan that induces the worker to supply the same e⁄ort ao but increases
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￿:
Therefore, there is an ￿ > 0 such that ￿(ao)￿(ao) + u(yo
L ￿^ ￿ + T) ￿ ￿(ao) > U￿. Consider now
the plan f^ yH; ^ yL;ao;nog, where ^ yL = yo
L ￿ ^ ￿ and ^ yH solves u(^ yH + T) = u(^ yL + T) + ￿(ao).
Clearly, ^ yL < yo
L and ^ yH < yo
H. The plan f^ yH; ^ yL;ao;nog is incentive compatible, satis￿es the IR
constraint, and increases the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts. Thus, fyo
H;yo
L;ao;nog cannot be optimal; therefore,
the IR must be binding.
Proposition 2: The IC constraint multiplier ￿ > 0.
Proof: This proof is a modi￿ed version of that in Holmstrom (1979). We proceed by




0(n‘(a))(lH ￿ lL) + yL ￿ yH] ￿ 0. (14)













The concavity of u implies yL ￿ yH. Thus,
n￿
0(a)[p(1 ￿ ￿)F
0(n‘(a))(lH ￿ lL) + yL ￿ yH] ￿ n￿
0(a)p(1 ￿ ￿)F
0(n‘(a))(lH ￿ lL) > 0:
This result contradicts (14); therefore, ￿ > 0.
Proposition 3: A private-ownership regime with ￿ = 0 and ￿ ! 1 attains the ex-ante
constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
58Proof: The ex-ante constrained-e¢ cient allocation solves
max
a;yH;yL
N [￿ (a)u(yH) + (1 ￿ ￿ (a))u(yL) ￿ ￿(a)]
subject to the IR and IC constraints
pF [N (￿ (a)lH + (1 ￿ ￿ (a))lL)] ￿ N [￿ (a)yH + (1 ￿ ￿ (a))yL] = 0
u(yH) ￿ u(yL) ￿ ￿(a) = 0
Let N=￿ and ￿N=￿ denote the Lagrange multiplier on the IR and IC constraints respectively.
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0 (a) = 0;
where the last condition uses the IC constraint. These conditions and the two constraints
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and ￿ ! 1. Then, the equilibrium allocation of the private ownership regime solves
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The ￿rst ￿ve equations coincide with those of the constrained-e¢ cient allocation and the last





59B.2 Computation of the static equilibrium under private ownership
We simplify the system (3 - 8) as follows. We write the payments yH and yL as a function of














￿ ￿ ￿=(1 ￿ ￿(a))
￿
￿ T
Replacing these expressions into the remaining equations gives the following system of 4 equa-
tions in 4 unknowns,
u(yH(T;￿;￿) + T) ￿ u(yL(T;￿;￿) + T) ￿ ￿(a) = 0
pF
0(N‘(a))‘(a) ￿ ￿(a)yH(T;￿;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(a))yL(T;￿;￿) = 0
N￿
0(a)[pF
0(N‘(a))(lH ￿ lL) + yL(T;￿;￿) ￿ yH(T;￿;￿))] ￿ ￿￿
0(a) = 0
pF(N‘(a))[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿] ￿ ￿N [￿(a)yH(T;￿;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿(a))yL(T;￿;￿)] ￿ TN = 0
We solve this system of equations on a grid of prices fp1;p2;:::;pMg using the Matlab routine
fsolve.m.15
B.3 Computation of the dynamic model
Because there is a one to one mapping between pt and zt, we use zt as our state variable. We
guess that the privatization region is an interval of the form ￿ = (￿1;z￿] and solve the model
under this assumption. We then check that all our experiments satisfy this property.
We use the following algorithm to solve the model
1. Find the functions UP(z), R(z), US(z), and U0
S(z) on a grid of points and linearly inter-
polate their values at each z not on the grid;
2. Choose a grid of points Z = fzig
M
i=1 ;
3. Choose initial guesses VP(z;0), VS(z;0), V
p
0 (z;0), and V 0
S(z;0) for each z 2 Z. For values
of z not in Z, we use linear interpolation. Set j=0.
(a) Find the nationalization threshold z￿ that solves VP(z￿;j) = V 0
S(z￿;j).
15Because a, ￿, ￿, and T are all positive, when solving the system of equations we de￿ne a = e~ a;￿ = e~ ￿,
￿ = e
~ ￿, and T = e
~ T, and solve for the zero using the tilde variables.
60(b) Given z￿, iterate on the following functional equation to obtain the ￿rm value W(z)
at each grid point z 2 Z







0;z) for all z 2 Z.
We evaluate the integral using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
(c) Given W(z), ￿nd U0
P(z) and R0(z) by solving the static equilibrium at the privatiz-
ation period at each z 2 Z.
(d) Given U0
P(z), R0(z), and the guesses VP(z;j), VS(z;j), V 0
P(z;j), and V 0
S(z;j), update
the value functions at each grid point z 2 Z using the Bellman equations:




























































We evaluate the integrals using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
(e) If value functions are converged, stop; if they are not, set j=j+1 and return to (a)
using the obtained functions as the new guess.
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